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The  discussion  focused  on  the  choice  between  total  and  military  gov 
ernment  spending,  identification  issues,  and  the  consequences  of  im 
plementation  lags. 
Rick Mishkin  began  the  discussion  by  pointing  out  that  not  only  was 
the Korean  War  a big  event,  but  it  was  also  the  closest  to  a perfect  ex 
periment,  given  that  it  was  completely  unanticipated.  Hence,  from  that 
viewpoint,  it  would  be  very  important  to keep  the Korean  War  in  the 
sample. 
Daron  Acemoglu  defended  the  use  of  overall  government  spending 
rather  than  just  defense  spending  by  arguing  that  if  one  views  the 
Ramey-Shapiro  dummies  as  instruments,  then  the  right  intervening 
variable  is not  defense  spending,  but  total  spending.  Valerie  Ramey  later 
confirmed  that  the  original  Ramey-Shapiro  (1998)  paper  had  indeed 
used  total  government  spending,  with  the  defense  dummy  variables  as 
instruments. 
Acemoglu  also  pointed  out  that  the  VAR  method  uses  more  data, 
whereas  in  the  dummy  variable  approach,  it  is unclear  how  to  think 
about  "asymptotics  on  four  observations."  He  concluded  by  suggesting 
a potential  reconciliation  between  the narrative  approach  and  the VAR 
approach.  The  first  approach  is exploiting  a source  of variation  in spend 
ing  that  is causing  a strictly  negative  wealth  shock,  so one would  tend  to 
find  a negative  effect.  Conversely,  Perotti's  approach  includes  spending 
on  education,  health,  and  so  on,  which  most  reasonable  frameworks 
would  model  as  complementary  to private  consumption.  That  source  of 
variation  creates  an  increase  in the marginal  propensity  of  consumption, 
and  hence  would  tend  to  result  in an  increase  in consumption.  Perhaps, 
he  offered,  the  two  approaches  are  actually  consistent  with  each  other, 
even  without  going  into  the  econometric  details,  although  there may  be 
other  reasons  why  one  approach  might  be  preferred  over  the  other. 248 Discussion 
Michael  Woodford  reiterated  the  basic  questions  of  the  paper,  par 
tially  in response  to Ricardo  Reis's  presentation,  which  had  implied  that 
a neoclassical  model  could  yield  any  response  depending  on what  one 
assumes  about  the policy  rules. Woodford  pointed  out  that  at  least  in the 
baseline  neoclassical  model  there  are  some  very  simple  predictions  that 
are  independent  of what  one  assumes  about  the  dynamics  of  the  fiscal 
shock.  In particular,  he  argued,  the  two  key  puzzles  that motivate  the 
paper  come  from  two  static  equilibrium  relations  in  the  neoclassical 
model.  First,  on  the  firm  side,  the  static  relation  between  the marginal 
product  of  labor  and  the  real wage  yields  a  relation  between  hours  and 
the  real wage.  Obtaining  an  increase  in hours  following  a  fiscal  shock 
that  leaves  productivity  unchanged  would  imply  a  lower  product  wage. 
Second,  in  the  representative  household's  problem,  the marginal  rate  of 
substitution  condition  between  consumption,  hours,  and  the  real wage, 
implies  that with  hours  going  up,  a  reduction  in  the  real wage  would 
have  to be  associated  with  a decline  in consumption.  Woodford  empha 
sized  the  fact  that  these  two  sign  restrictions  on  the  predictions  of  the 
model  are  independent  of  the dynamics  of  the  shock  to government  pur 
chases,  and  are  in  fact  the  focus  of  the paper. 
Valerie  Ramey  highlighted  the  paper  by  Burnside,  Eichenbaum,  and 
Fisher  (2004), which  looks  at  the  effect  of  defense  spending  in a neoclas 
sical  framework  with  distortionary  taxes,  whereas  common  New  Key 
nesian  models  still  assume  nondistortionary  taxes,  and  suggested  that 
more  investigation  is needed  in  this  area. 
Michael  Woodford  also  commented  on  the  choice  between  defense 
spending  and  overall  spending.  He  acknowledged  that  in earlier  work 
with  Julio  Rotemberg  (1992),  they  had  entirely  focused  on  military 
spending,  to address  concerns  that  government  spending  may  respond 
to  the  state  of productivity  in  the  economy.  But,  he  argued,  Perotti's  ap 
proach  is attempting  to address  the  endogeneity  issue  through  a differ 
ent means,  which  is  the  timing  restriction.  From  this  perspective,  even  if 
one  considers  other  components  of  government  spending,  which  may 
be  correlated  with  productivity,  causality  might  not  be  an  issue  if one  be 
lieves  that  the  assumed  timing  restrictions  neutralize  it. 
The  discussion  then  shifted  to  identification  issues,  with  Mark  Gertler 
echoing  Reis's  concerns  about  using  the  impulse  responses  to discrimi 
nate  between  the  neoclassical  and  New  Keynesian  models.  Gertler's 
concern  stemmed  from  the  fact  that  just  as  in  the neoclassical  model  the 
responses  can  be  very  sensitive  to  the  fiscal  policy  rule,  in  the New  Key 
nesian  model  responses  are  sensitive  to  the monetary  policy  rule.  In fact, Discussion  249 
he  argued,  if the world  is  New  Keynesian,  the policy  of  an  effective  cen 
tral  bank  can make  the  economy  look  like  a  real  business  cycle  (RBC) 
economy,  and  that will  make  identification  difficult.  But  the  positive 
spin  to his  comment  was  that  if one  believes  that  there  are  periods  in 
which  these  rules  change,  then  one  can  exploit  that  in  the  identification 
and  look  for  changes  in  the  impulse  responses.  Gertler  concluded  with 
"a point  on  intellectual  history,"  stressing  that  Timothy  Cogley  and  Jim 
Nason  (1995) were  the  ones  to  first  notice  the  lack  of  persistence  in  the 
predictions  of RBC models. 
Olivier  Blanchard  sought  to reconcile  the debate  on  variable  choice  by 
suggesting  that  if  all  government  spending  affects  outcomes,  but  de 
fense  spending  is exogenous,  then  one  should  have  defense  spending  be 
an  instrument  for  government  spending.  Alternatively,  one  could  in 
clude  both  variables  in  the VAR  and  look  at  the  effects.  The  second  point 
Blanchard  made  was  on  the  issue  of  implementation  lags.  Blanchard 
and  Perotti  (2002)  showed  that  in principle,  if one  is willing  to  take  a 
stand  on  how  long  before  the  event  takes  place  people  actually  know 
what  will  happen,  then  one  can  actually  handle  the  issue  by  using 
spending  measured  next  period  as  shocks  for  this period.  Blanchard  also 
stressed  differences  between  the VAR  and  dummy  variable  approaches. 
First  of  all,  the  shocks  of  a VAR  have  different  magnitudes  compared 
with  the binary  value  of  a dummy.  Second,  different  episodes  have  dif 
ferent  fiscal  compositions  (spending  versus  tax  revenues)  which  cannot 
be  captured  with  a dummy  approach. 
[The  author  was  unable  to be  present  and  so was  not  able  to  respond 
to  the  discussion.] 